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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie una Physiologie der Sinnesorgane; Phil. Jahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie.*—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL.

Hegel's Treatment of the Categories of Quality. J. E. McTAGGART. Mind, 44, pp. 503–526.

This article deals with one of the nine subdivisions of the Greater Logic. Quality is again subdivided into Being, Being Determinate, and Being-for-Self. In connection with the first, we note that the category of Becoming is unfortunately named, because it implies change which really is not present. A better name would have been Transition to Being Determinate. Passing to the second division, it is not clear why we first have reality in the category Something ; but the transition under Being Determinate as such is valid because plurality is introduced. In the second step, under Finitude, as that whose nature is limited by something outside itself, is found not only limit but an extremely subtle trichotomy of the sixth order, Determination, Modification, and Limit. The internal nature of the finite something is named Ought to afford an opportunity for criticising the ethics of Kant and Fichte. Negative infinity does not involve real change, but only a change of judgment about reality. Affirmative infinity means that the nature of the something lies in the relation of itself to its other. Here Idealism becomes possible. The finite is Ideal, that is, it has been seen and also transcended. Passing to Being-for-Self, the third division of Quality, a thing is qualitatively differentiated from its other ; yet it has stability which saves it from the infinite series of others. The positive nature of the other is no longer essential. Qualitative differences are substituted by rudimentary numerical differences. To the objection that abstract quantitative determination is not a higher category, we may say that although self-determined beings are conceived more adequately when qualitatively determined, yet it does not follow that abstract self-existence without quality is lower than abstract quality without self-existence. The significance of Being for One is negative, it might have been named not being for other. In the relation of Repulsion and Attraction, the last trace of Quality has died out. The ones have become indifferent to each other, and are exactly alike. And with this Quantity is reached. N. E. TRUMAN.

La philosophie de la contingence. L. NÖEL. Rev. Néo-Scolastique, IX, 3, pp. 365–380.

This philosophy arose out of that of Kant. After rejecting as useless Kant's noumenal liberty, M. Boutroux affirms that there may be liberty in the phenomenal world based on contingency. If it can be proved that there is some irreducible contingency, it is possible to think that the laws of nature do not rule absolutely, but have their reason in the causes dominating them. He does not believe that the irresistible need of the mind should rule phenomena, but that one must investigate matter to form sane and adequate conceptions of it. He attacks science in general, in order to show the impossibility of deducing absolute necessity. In the first place, the necessity can only be relative — given a condition, *a*, some other, *b*, is bound to follow. The only way to prove that *b* must follow *a*, is to prove an identity. But the syllogism, by which one would prove this identity, adds something to one of the terms not derivable by analysis. The different sciences are not merely an extension of logic. Mathematics, mechanics, physics, chemistry, etc., each adds something of its own. Mathematics has its limits. It is an abstract science, and concrete, living being refuses to conform entirely to it. 'Nothing is created or destroyed' is the law from which is deduced the equivalence of cause and effect. But this equivalence is absurd. If the cause were equal to the effect, it would necessarily be one with it, and could not be a new thing. If different, it must be distinguished by some new irreducible thing not derivable from the cause. Finality is an explanation in which appeal is made to that which does not yet exist. Finality, for M. Boutroux, demands contingency. In conscious action the strongest motive prevails ; but that motive is often the strongest, not in itself, but because the unconditioned will chooses it. But how can mind affect matter without adding new force ? M. Boutroux answers : Life and mechanism are not apart, but the separation is an abstraction. He also attacks the phenomenalistic conception of causality. If phenomena are self-posited and independent, they cannot be causes except by themselves becoming the effect — hence not causes. His idea is that efficient causes are less mechanical, and more susceptible of finality. But when the efficient cause is subject to finality, it gives law. Here M. Nöel differs from M. Boutroux. He agrees with M. Boutroux in rejecting blind determinism and the Spinozistic deduction of natural laws ; but he differs in that he maintains necessity based on finality. Both alike oppose the phenomenalistic conception of causality. O. G. SHUMARD.

Mind and Nature. A. E. TAYLOR. Int. J. E., XIII, 1, pp. 55–86.

The author here presents a philosophy of nature which vindicates our poetical interpretations, and is opposed to the mechanical view of the world. Anticipating the argument that our feelings toward nature are mere aspects of our own mental presentations, mere reading our own feelings into perceptions whose *esse* is *percipi*, the author criticises the

Berkeleyan denial of independent objective existence. The arguments based on common sense and physiological analogy are rejected as unreliable. Our assurance of the existence of the objective world, as we experience it, is rather found in our assurance of the existence of our fellow-beings. *Their* existence is manifest through our consciousness of our own purposive actions. I find myself constantly giving expression to purposes which would have no meaning unless I were an organic part in a vast system of purposive agents. The reality of purposes independent of myself is guaranteed by that very same experience which assures me of the reality of my own purposes. The very apprehension of my own existence as an intelligent purposive being is itself the apprehension of purposes of other conscious intelligent existences, my fellows. Belief in the existence of fellow-beings immediately involves belief in the existence of the whole physical world. Tracing, now, the development of our attitude toward the objective world, we find that as children we ascribe feeling and purpose to both organic and inorganic beings. We later come to note *special* purposive action in animate nature, and, taking into account the ways it is affected by our own expressions of purpose, we attach a special purposive connotation to persons and animals. The process is not eminently one of discovering the analogy between our fellows' actions and a definitely perceived individuality in our own actions. We get to know others as we know ourselves ; we get to know ourselves as we know others. Because of the regularity with which inanimate objects reply to our conduct, we learn that we may assume intelligent purpose and conscious individuality to be non-existent for such objects. By no means can we argue, from our failure to identify ends in nature, that none are there. We have, however, more than this negative side — this mere failure to affirm the presence of dead, purposeless action in nature. Apart from primitive superstition, our whole experience gives us a sense (perhaps too remote from human life for comprehension) of the presence of purpose in our natural environment. We read mysterious and baffling life rather than death in nature's changing aspects ; we read an inexplicable sympathy with all that is purest and kindliest in our own human nature. There is in us, in fine, a definite sense of comradeship with nature. This sense, moreover, is not occasional and exceptional with all. A poetical view of the world, based on immediate experience, is entitled to as much philosophic consideration as the necessarily one-sided view of the materialistic physicist.

Lastly, we may criticise the grounds upon which nature is so often described as a mere mechanism. The argument that nature is regular and uniform in her operations, whereas the very essence of mind is to be arbitrary and uncertain, is a misstatement. The truth is that, in order to predict the behavior of individuals, we need special information. Rational action exhibits adherence to definite plan. A further objection is that we can predict events of nature without knowing her purposes. To this we say that we predict only general natural tendencies, not particular phenomena; not, *e. g.*, each individual movement of a gnat's wing. Likewise, in human action we may predict, from our laws of averages, general social tendencies, tendencies of the aggregate. Finally, we recognize two facts regarding all machines: (1) all machines are the creation of purposive agents; (2) all machines are the direct and transparent embodiment of specific purpose. Hence, if nature is but a machine, she should be dependent on conscious intelligence, and the realization of manifest purpose. A mechanism can be rightly conceived only as a subordinate aspect of intelligent teleological action.

C. A. HEBB.

PSYCHOLOGICAL.

The Problem of Attention. O. KÜLPE. Monist, XIII, 1, pp. 38-68.

The purpose of this article is to develop a comprehensive view of the nature and functions of attention in the light of the results obtained by subjecting its phenomena in their quantitative and qualitative aspects directly to careful investigation. In sense perception, three factors, objective, peripheral, and central, are found to contribute to distinctness. The chief problem of attention, viz., the exact determination of the nature of the attentive state, consists in determining just what constitutes the central or psycho-physical distinctness, and how to distinguish it from the objective and peripheral forms. The chief difficulties attending the solution of this problem are: (1) There is a close intrinsic connection between attention and the processes and mechanisms that subserve peripheral distinctness. Hence we run a very real danger of ascribing to attention results that are actually conditioned upon the special adjustment of the sense organ concerned. (2) If we are to have any exact knowledge of the degrees of consciousness, we must be able to vary them at will, to induce at our pleasure this or that grade of psycho-physical distinctness as independently as may be of extrinsic influences. This may be accomplished by distracting the attention, or by dividing it; but distraction of the attention, in a strict sense of the term, simply means the inducing of inattention, and the distribution of attention can never be really uniform. Furthermore, the power of a stimulus or an occupation to distract the attention does not remain constant, so that it is clear that, if we are to induce a determinate degree of consciousness, we must know, first, the mode of distribution of the total energy of attention over the separate conscious contents included within its range; and secondly, the distractive value of the processes which we have selected for our purpose. No general rule can be laid down under either heading. (3) When we attempt to study the changes in conscious contents that follow upon a partial withdrawal of the attention, we find that the very conditions of our inquiry are hostile to any adequate account of the altered experience; for it is essential, if we are to describe what we perceive, that we be able to hold our attention upon the objects presented, while the more effective is the distraction, the more imperfectly can this be done, and the more imperfect is our portrayal of consciousness. Hence we cannot tell how much should be ascribed to the change in consciousness, and how much to mere inadequacy of description. Considering distribution with reference to a lowering of concentration, the first thing to be noticed is that the *comparison* or *discrimination* of sense impressions is seriously affected by division or diversion of the attention in whatever way produced. Not only do the judgments of comparison show large variations, but the just noticeable difference also reaches an unusually high value. That the subjective difference of two weights, in dealing with pressure, for example, is so much reduced by reduction of the attention, evidently cannot be ascribed to any peripheral cause, for the stimulation is the same in both cases, and the skin does not possess any mechanism of accommodation to pressure, the only effect of which, if it did exist, would be to make the weights appear heavier or lighter as they were applied, which shift of subjective intensity would neither increase nor diminish the difference between the two. Neither can we find a reason for this in the central conditions of sensation, for a weakening of the excitatory processes in the cerebral center, such as might result from a lessened excitability of a sensory center, could not bring about a reduction of the apparent differences between the two, nor could we give any reason for the approximation of the excitatory processes themselves. We are therefore forced to ascribe the changes in discrimination to the mind's own power of apprehension, directly dependent upon its preparedness to apprehend. This preparedness consists in the excitability and revivability of the ideas employed for the required comparison, the mental activities that may subserve speech, and, in a measure, the motor innervations that precede the deliverance of a judgment of comparison. In this, the reason that the differential limen is raised is readily seen, and we get our first insight into the real nature of psycho-physical distinctness. In estimating the influence of attention upon *sensitivity*, it is important to find that we are able to favor any of the attributes of sensation at the expense of the others. Concentration upon the pitch of a tone, for instance, diminishes the apparent intensity or duration. Further distribution enhances this effect. No such influence, however, has been out in the case of quality, which fact, perhaps, more clearly than any other shows the vanity of an appeal to peripheral factors, for we find no trace in the sensory organs that should favor this or any attribute of sensation at the expense of the others. The true explanation will probably involve the consideration of but two factors, preparedness for the particular sensation, and susceptibility to the ideas which the sensations are able to revive. Preparedness, in the form of expectation, increases the excitability of the sensory centers and produces a stronger tendency towards the reproduction of the ideas which aid in assimilating, interpreting, and defining the impressions received. However, it is readily seen that we have more in the above phenomena than can be accounted for by these conditions, for they do not explain how the pitch of a tone, for instance, can be better prepared for than its intensity or duration, since, so far as these attributes are concerned, the excitation is just as much an indivisible unity as is the sensation or stimulus. But since every one of these attributes has its own associative connections with other ideas, we have only to conceive that the group of mental processes connected with the quality of an impression has attained a higher degree of preparedness than the group associated to the intensity or duration, to readily understand that the former will be more easily perceived and more quickly identified than the latter. A third fact in the sphere of sensory attention is the analysis of complex perceptions — a function so important that some psychologists make it fundamental in the psychology of attention. This does not necessitate special treatment, as it is obvious that it implies the work of sensitivity and sensible discrimination, and is thus subsumed under the two heads already discussed. Experiments show that the direction of attention is too indefinite to perform the task of analysis, unless there is a preparedness of ideas relating to the separate constituents of the complex impression. Thus the facts again force us to the conclusion that the mental state or attitude we term attention consists in the preparedness of the ideas reproducible by the various contents of consciousness. Considering distribution with reference to the range of attention, we find that it reduces the number of objects that can be grasped with one complete concentration, when identification or recognition is involved in the process. That it should reduce the number of constituents in a total impression, rather than make the presentation itself uniformly indistinct, is explained by the different susceptibility to different objects, and the difference in preparedness or central excitability. This is borne out by the fact that a suitable change in the predisposition of the subject lowers the degree of consciousness for all objects alike with comparatively slight changes in the range. With excitability and preparedness of ideas as our determinant factors, it readily follows that memory and recollection, reproduction and association, are peculiarly dependent upon the processes to which the name attention is given. Also, the relative slowness with which it passes from one content to another, forms the foundation of all rhythmical articulation and division. The peculiar mood of interest, too, is very intimately related to the attentive state, in that it is the emotional state which invariably accompanies a strain of the attention, provided that it is not carried so far as to induce fatigue or dull the faculties. Passing over bodily accompaniments and the factors of involuntary attention to the consideration of whether our theory affords adequate explanation of our ability to resist distracting stimuli, we find that, if susceptibility to peripheral and central excitations depends upon our preparedness to receive them, the whole of the individual's past with all of its associations are arrayed in battle order to meet the scattered assaults of chance. Behind attention and behind distinct consciousness, stands the whole experience of a personality ; and with attention trained by education we can transcend the limits of our organism, propounding and realizing ideal ends.

C. E. FERREE.

Le langage et la parole: leurs facteurs sociologiques. GÉRARD-VARET. Rev. Ph., XXVII, 10, pp. 367–391.

Wundt's *Die Sprache* is the occasion of this article. In the old theories of language, there were two explanations, the physiological and the psychological. Wundt makes use of both of these factors by connecting them with a factor which partakes of the nature of both, viz., the vocal gesture (*Lautgeberde*). But since language is a social phenomenon, the author thinks that there may be some social conditions which have thus far been overlooked. The first condition is communication. He observes that, in rural districts where work is routine and in families where the privilege of speaking belongs to the father, intercourse is largely by signs and gestures. What is needed, in each case, to call language into use, is some stimulus from without. Communication with other people of different habits is such a stimulus. The author attacks the view that the factors of language were produced by emotion and imitation. The argument (*a*) against the emotional origin is that language is a patient and calm work of analysis, while emotion is a violent and tumultuous synthesis; (*b*) against the chance origin from occasional emotional states (*Zufallstheorie*), he argues that universal and permanent phenomena could not arise from accidental and individual cases. Imitation is criticized on the ground of vagueness and narrowness. But the principle of imitation is not so bad as its application, *i. e.*, to the external world. For it regards man as passive and learning to speak from phenomena. The correct application of the principle of imitation is to the useful and important acts of man himself. So far no distinction has been made between the gesture and the word. The question arises, What are the causes of the survival of the word instead of the gesture? The reason for this is the superior efficiency of the word in directing the concerted action of a body of men in war or peace; and in putting man in relation to deity. The function of the word is, in every case, social. The development of language, therefore, is neither purely mechanical and biological nor directed and psychological; but it is both, since it is sociological. H. C. STEVENS.

The Unity of Process in Consciousness. H. R. MARSHALL. Mind, 44, pp. 470–503.

From the strictly objective point of view, the biologist finds a unity of process in all living matter, the reproduction of its kind. In observing the effect of stimulus, he finds that a capacity of 'learning by experience' is present in all forms of living matter. In animal activity there is a complexity due to variety of structure; but in this systematic complexity there also appears a unity of process. Complex animals are systems of systems, and in man systematic coördination is observed in the highest degree. In reflex action some minor system is practically disconnected from the whole. The receptive, coördinating, and reactive systems function in one and the same act. At any given moment there is an activity of the system of systems, together with an increment of activity in some particular part. Even where the 'neurergic patterns' assume very complex forms, there is unity of process in the activities of man's nervous system. Hesitancy or immediacy of reaction depend upon the more or less diverse activities set up by the stimulus in the coördinating system. Adaptation is the case of a whole complex organism 'learning from experience.' The final adjustment of the 'neurergic pattern' to new conditions must often be due to some influence from within the mass of the system of systems. From the introspective point of view, some of the increments have spatial quality, others do not. Modifications in the nervous system are in some manner coördinate with the non-spatial increments of consciousness. Unity of process which is found in nerve action appears also in consciousness. Emotion and conative action affect the 'noëtic pattern.' The self, as the sum total of undifferentiable psychic activities can never appear as an increment in consciousness. But in self-consciousness there is an increment as empirical ego, to which another increment accrues. These facts also correspond with the activities of the neural system. We are compelled to assume a unity of process in the conscious life. From this point of view, the distinctions between reflex and instinctive activities and between habit and instinct are not fundamental. The sharp distinction between instinct and intelligence implies denial of unity of process. Yet the 'effective consciousness' here introduced is only an emphasis on some element in a complex psychic presentation. In acts of will the influence, which finally breaks down the opposition between tendencies to reaction, comes from the undifferentiated mass of psychic activities. N. E. TRUMAN.

ETHICAL.

The Definition of Will. F. H. BRADLEY. Mind, 44, pp. 437–469.

"A volition is the self-realization of an idea with which the self is identified." In it we find the following aspects: existence, idea of change, actual change of existence to the idea's content, and the self-feeling itself realized in this change. Existence is the actual series of events continuous with my here and now. Volition begins by an alteration of present existence as such. The will to know alters the existence of the person though not of the object. The existence must be changed to the character of the idea; and the idea must itself alter the existence; though not the whole complex cause, it must enter the causal sequence. The identification with self will be treated in the following articles. Resolve differs from volition in the fact that it is directed on what is not yet actual. They are confused, because (1) will is taken to mean standing tendency, or (2) resolve sometimes involves volition of a psychical state, or (3) resolve partakes of the nature of an incomplete volition. To be even incomplete will, the idea must not only have subdued any idea contrary to itself and have individualized its own nature, but it must also have carried on this process until a part of the characteristic change implied by the idea is a psychical or perhaps a physical fact. In resolve there is a movement of the idea to alter the fact. This may amount to an incomplete will, but such a result is not directly aimed at. Approval is not volition unless the idea approved is of a change here and now. In volition there can be only one independent idea, and this is followed by its own unmodified result. Volition does not imply judgment; the qualification of the change as my act need not be part of the idea's original content, and the result may follow the suggestion without delay. The idea of an action, if qualified as impossible or doubtful, is not truly the idea of that action. Desire, in any proper sense, or attention need not be present in will. An idea of the end must always be present; but this may not be specific or based on an image. Gesture and involuntary instinctive movements are not will, because the idea is not of a change in my present existence. In the case of imitation, we have to determine whether the idea has freed itself from the condition of an alien personality. It is possible to aim at something which is not to be experienced by the self. Volition does not necessarily end when the idea is turned into a perception. N. E. TRUMAN.

Natur und Kultur im sozialen Individuum. A. VIERKANDT. V. f. w. Ph., XXVI, 3, pp. 361–382.

An answer to the question, "In what sense can the concepts 'nature' and 'culture' be applied to the individual and his conscious processes?", will help us to understand and justify the opposition of popular and scientific speech to the view that the concept of nature refers solely to the physical world. It is admitted that the individual and his conscious processes do not fall absolutely under the concept of culture, as the term is ordinarily understood, that is, as the totality of material and spiritual 'culture-goods' of a people, such as tools, language, customs, etc. All these 'culture-goods' stand towards the individual in an objective relation of externality and independence of his voluntary influence. In its wider sense, too, culture stands over against the individual, who is its bearer or substrate. This relation, however, justifies the application of the concept of culture to certain sides and parts of the content of the individual's consciousness. From the standpoint of evolution, nature appears the oldest endowment of man, and culture, as the sum-total of all later acquirements of society. Carried over to the single individual, this means that if we think of him as permanently untouched by any of the influences of culture, then we should apply to him the concept of nature alone. All that in him which is changed through the influence of society and of culture we subsume under the concept of culture. We can, then, speak of nature in the individual in the two-fold sense of form and content. In the latter sense, there belong to his nature the conscious processes in so far as they are essentially untouched by the influence of culture; in the former, the totality of laws, uniformities, and characteristic peculiarities of the stream of consciousness. In how far can certain branches of the mental sciences be called natural? Beginning with psychology, we find that it has to do only with the nature of man in the sense of the term established above. On the one hand, it establishes laws, types, and peculiarities of the stream of consciousness; and, regarded from the side of content, it has to do with such conscious processes as belong absolutely to the nature of man. The other branches of mental science, such as sociology, ethnology, etc., can also be put down among the natural sciences, at least from their general character and tendency, if not from their actual content. M. S. MACDONALD.

The Ethics of Nietzsche and Guyau. ALFRED FOUILLÉE. Int. J. E., XIII, 1, pp. 13–26.

The philosophy of Zarathoustra is far from being in tune with modern progress. Nietzsche attempts to explain every act of man by the will to be powerful, to overcome obstacles. He adopts Schopenhauer's theory of the will and combines it with Darwin's theory of universal struggle. Individuals are for him centers of will, each one aspiring to be all and to appropriate all. Nietzsche's error lies in his neglect to analyze and fathom the idea of life on which he bases his doctrine of morals. Guyau points out the error. He shows that, if we take Nietzsche's view of 'the will to live, to be powerful,' we are obliged to look for the foundations of morality, first, in the domain of causality, not in that of finality; in the domain of the actually existent desire, not in that of the desirable; and, secondly, in the common domain of the conscious and the unconscious, which is precisely the basis of life. Guyau here seems to be in the right. We cannot, as Nietzsche has done, ignore voluntary aim and the desirable, subjecting all to instinct, to blind will. Nietzsche bids us give ourselves up to the natural evolution of events, to blindly struggle for existence. Both Nietzsche and Guyau regard the ethics of life as an ethics of intensity and vital expansion, but they take entirely different points of view. Nietzsche saw only the natural law of division and opposition; he did not see the more fundamental law of union and harmony. Guyau emphasizes the fact that struggle does not prevent harmony; there should be a 'coincidence' between finality and causality; there should be an organic union, a fusion of the individual and the universal. C. A. HEBB.

Moralisme et immoralisme. G. PALANTE. Rev. Ph., XXVII, 9, pp. 242–248.

Nietzsche has given to the world the new problem of immoralism, but H. Heine should be regarded as a precursor of the movement. Moralism is the subordination of the individual to the ends of the race. The conception of the social group is an abstraction which must give way to the individual. The terms immoralism and individualism can be identified. Immoralism is an attempt to displace the false teleology of the race by emphasizing the rights and ends of the individual. Nietzsche opposes

Kantian and post-Kantian ethics on the same ground that he opposes Christianity, viz., on the ground of ultimate social reference. For philosophy the problem of moralism *versus* immoralism transforms itself into the problem of egoism *versus* altruism. Guyau believes that altruism will finally triumph over egoism. Schopenhauer and Ribot are quoted to confirm the writer's view that there are two or more ultimate tendencies in human nature. G. W. T. WHITNEY.

La téléologie sociale et son mécanisme. G. PALANTE. Rev. Ph. XXVII, 8, pp. 149–159.

The idea of finality is an empty form. The only scientific side of finality is its mechanical aspect. We go back to the early stages of the race to see the psychical mechanism from which the idea of social teleology arose. The first law of primitive people is the law of mental inertia, with the corollary of least work. This law is instinctive and the dispositions which it inspires are adapted to the immediate difficulties. At first man's prevision is very limited and he looks only to the needs of the present, but with more experience his view is broadened, and he recognizes a utility beyond the here and the now. The first law thus transforms itself into the law of maximum of effect. At this stage, there is an awakening of energetic disposition and willed action takes the place of instinctive action. It is teleological, in the sense that it implies the representation of the ends to be obtained. Division of labor now appears. Wealth is accumulated for the future, and at length riches are sought as an end. Personality tends to be lost in industry, literature, art, and morality; uniformity prevails. The excessive development of the law of the maximum of advantageous effects produces social disorganization and economic crises. It is the duty of the individual to break away from this industrial uniformity and return to æsthetic diversity. If this return is not made, industry, art, and culture are doomed. A third law appears in the modern world, the law of the organization of human activities to promote harmonious and intense individual life. At the end of the article, the writer concludes that there is no absolute end, no absolute social well-being, and no absolutely fixed direction of development. G. W. T. WHITNEY.

HISTORICAL.

Sur une des origines de la philosophie de Leibniz. G. RODIER. Rev. de Mét., X, 5, pp. 552–564.

The purpose of the present discussion — called forth by an article recently published in this *Revue* by M. Brochard — is to indicate briefly the influence of Plotinus upon the doctrine of Leibniz, and to show that the close affiliation of the systems of these two writers can only be the result of common metaphysical principles. That the neo-Platonist should be rarely mentioned among the inspirers of Leibniz is especially strange in view of the striking similarity of terms and metaphors found in the *Enneads* and the *Monadology*. Both agree that the intelligible world, beyond time and space, contains a multiplicity — is composed of simple substances, thinking spirits, ideas. Since these are without parts, no change can be produced in them from without. Quantitatively alike, the variety of nature demands that they differ in quality. This distinguishing quality or essence is thought, whose continuity conditions the uninterrupted existence of substance, and whose logically implied change is of relations and affections. The universal Substance and Intelligence of Plotinus, just as the God of Leibniz, implies and is implied in all simple substances, each one of which contains potentially all the changes that can ever occur in it. Each is a microcosm, an element in an indissoluble system, a totality, whose own essence is its sufficient *raison d'être*, 'a living perpetual mirror of the universe.' Applying this thought to epistemology, Plotinus, foreshadowing his German disciple, takes an important step towards a rational solution of the problem. It follows from the nature of substance, that knowledge of any one thing implies all the other things with which that one is in relation, and so knowledge is entire in each of its parts. There are no isolated facts; every fragment of truth is essentially truth as a whole. Otherwise science would not be a system. The (purely ideal) influence exerted upon one substance by another can only be accounted for by supposing that the universal Intelligence, in regulating each thing at the beginning, had regard to all the others, and found in each substance reasons compelling its accommodation to all the rest. But this accommodation is radically exclusive of all contingency and liberty. It is merely a matter of logical or mathematical determination, an eternal necessity, without any moral or teleological significance. Indeed, prevision in the engendering Intelligence is useless, since only one alternative, determined by the nature of a substance, is possible. The world of spirits is beautiful simply because it cannot be otherwise : every part of an organism is necessarily what it is because of its existence in and for the whole. An appearance of freedom is given to man's actions, in the sense that they result from the exercise of his own right reason ; but his reason is, in turn, determined by the nature of his mind. The establishment of the relationship of the two doctrines under discussion is of considerable interest and importance. Not only does the system of Leibniz become clearer when viewed in the light of neo-Platonic pantheism, but the theory of Intelligence, thought of as capable of its later development, is seen to possess more depth and originality than is ordinarily attributed to it. That Leibniz, fond of displaying his vast erudition and of quoting the thoughts of others which even remotely confirmed his own, should have omitted to cite Plotinus, is no doubt due to the fact that this writer had been read at a time when the influence of his profound thought was not consciously recognized.

A. D. MONTGOMERY.